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Abstract
This paper responds to the contributions by Alexander Bird, Nathan
Wildman, David Yates, Jennifer McKitrick, Giacomo Giannini & Matthew
Tugby, and Jennifer Wang. I react to their comments on my 2015 book
Potentiality: From Dispositions to Modality, and in doing so expands
on some of the arguments and ideas of the book.
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I am very grateful to Lorenzo Azzano and Andrea Borghini, and
to the seven contributors for this special issue, from whose papers I
have learned a great deal. I am deeply honoured (and quite delighted)
by the time and effort they invested in thinking about potentiality in
general, and about Potentiality in particular. In what follows, I will
not be able to address every point in as much detail as it deserves,
and in some cases I will only indicate the direction in which I think
further discussion should go. These are not rhetorical devices, but
rather expressions of my hope that these discussions will continue.
1 Dispositions and conditionals: Response
to Bird
Potentiality, like many metaphysical topics, can be approached from
two directions. We can come to it from ‘the manifest image’, our ev-
eryday understanding of our own abilities and the dispositions of the
objects in our environment. Or else, we can approach it from ‘the
scientific image’, taking our best scientific theories, perhaps interpret-
ing them and drawing whatever conclusions can be drawn from them.
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There is no guarantee that the two images will converge; often, it is
argued that they are in opposition to each other. One tenet of my book
is that in the case of potentiality, the two images happily converge on
a common picture – and in fact that they do so twice over. First, both
images make it natural to take potentiality as a primitive, not to be
reduced away as it would be in a Humean ontology. In this, I believe,
Alexander Bird and I are in agreement. Second, both images suggest
a conception of potentiality or – to use the more common term from
which I start – of dispositions that is very different from the conception
which philosophers have standardly accepted. It is here that Alexander
Bird disagrees with me.
In chapters 2–3 of Potentiality, I rejected the orthodox conception
which links dispositions, either reductively or non-reductively, to coun-
terfactual conditionals, and developed instead a conception of dispo-
sitions that links them to graded possibility. To characterize ordinary
dispositions such as fragility, instead of
(F-S) x is fragile iff were x subjected to a stress, x would break,
I proposed
(F-V’) x is fragile iff x could break easily.
My initial argument for (F-V’) included both semantic and meta-
physical considerations, semantics being, I take it, one of our best
guides to the ‘manifest image’. I then turned to the scientific im-
age to discuss ‘nomological dispositions’ (ch.2.6), i.e., dispositions that
encode a genuine law of nature, and argued that for non-semantic rea-
sons they, too, are not best captured by a conditional conception. (The
argument is a generalization of my criticism of Bird 2007, as formu-
lated in Vetter 2012.) Rather, I argued, nomological dispositions are
best integrated into the picture that arose from the manifest image:
potentiality, which is characterized only by a manifestation, comes in
degrees; ordinary dispositions such as fragility are situated at the lower
end of the degree spectrum, while nomological dispositions are to be
found at its higher, maximal end.
I did not then and I do now take myself to be ‘drawing conclusions
about fundamental aspects of modality from evidence regarding our use
of everyday expression’ (Bird, p. 9). Semantic considerations about
everyday expressions illuminate the manifest image, and the concepts
we use even in understanding the scientific image. And being clear on
our concepts is useful even when we go on to apply them to under-
stand the scientific image. But it is considerations about nomological
dispositions themselves, not about semantics, that justify my including
them in the picture which is suggested by the semantics.
So much for methology. Bird, however, has objections both to my
claims about semantics (the manifest image) and about nomological
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dispositions (the scientific image). I believe that I can dispel the first
objection, but the second will require more extensive discussion than
I can provide here (and now).
Let me take up the semantic objection first, then. With regard
to (F-V’), Bird asks: ‘How is the “easily” qualification supposed to
be understood?’, and answers: ‘It is to be understood, as others have
done, in terms of close possible worlds’ (p. 4), i.e. as x breaking in at
least one (or a few) of the possible worlds that share our laws and have
‘exact matches in matters of particular fact’ (p. 4, fn. 2). He then
goes on to provide a counterexample to (F-V’) thus understood, where
a fragile glass is from its creation so shielded that it does not break
in any close world, i.e., its fragility is always masked. His diagnosis is
that I have mistaken the force of ‘easily’, which he thinks qualifies the
implicit stimulus and not the nature of the modality involved.1
My response is different from the one that Bird envisages (on p.
5f.), however. For I do not appeal to closeness as understood here.
Rather, I argue that the easy possibility involved in dispositions is
best captured by a proportional model, if it is captured in possible-
worlds terms at all: whether or not an object x is fragile is a matter
of x’s breaking in a sufficient proportion or relevant worlds (Vetter
2015, 72ff.). Those relevant worlds, in turn, are not supposed to be
the close worlds of Lewisian semantics. Rather, they should ‘provide
maximal variation in the external circumstances. The proportion of
cases in which a vase breaks ... should not depend on factors that are
external to the vase’ (Vetter 2015, 77; see also Vetter 2014).2 Bird’s
shielded glass, on this understanding, will break in as many of the
relevant worlds (or cases) as one that is not so shielded, because its
being shielded will not be held fixed across the relevant worlds. (For
more on the proportional understanding of dispositions, see sections
2 and 3, and the contributions by Wildman and Yates to which they
respond.) This, I believe, rebuts Bird’s first worry.
Bird’s second worry, however, is not so easily dispelled. So let us
turn to that worry: the ‘problem of non-conditional possibilities’.
The problem arises from three assumptions (together with some
observations on modal logic):
1. On a dispositionalist view all modality has to depend (or, Bird
says, supervene) on dispositions at the fundamental level.
1Note that Lowe (2011) and Aimar (2018) would both agree with Bird on the reading
of ‘easily’ and still opt for a possibility account of dispositions. I will not take that route,
but I think it is a live option.
2Note that this applies, as it stands, only to intrinsic dispositions. For extrinsic dispo-
sitions, those external factors on which the disposition depends should not be varied; see
Vetter 2015, 75f., fn.10.
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2. All dispositions that are fundamental are nomological disposi-
tions (i.e. dispositions that encode a law of nature).
3. All nomological dispositions have an internal conditional struc-
ture.
The first assumption arises simply from the idea that everything
is grounded in the fundamental level; I will not question it in what
follows. The second assumption is natural given that we take funda-
mental physics to be our best guide to the fundamental level. The
third assumption is one which I shared in Vetter 2015, chs. 2.5-2.6 and
3.5; what I argue there is that the conditional nature of nomological
dispositions is better characterized by my view of dispositions, which
takes the conditional nature to be embedded in the disposition’s man-
ifestation, rather than giving the disposition itself the structure of a
(counterfactual) conditional. Given the three assumptions, however,
the fundamental dispositions are all conditional: they give rise to pos-
sibilities (or indeed necessities) for certain conditionals to be true, but
they do not yield any non-conditional possibilities.
The result is somewhat ironic since my view was precisely charac-
terized by its focus on possibilities and not conditionals; accordingly,
the problem starts out in Bird’s paper as a problem for the standard
conception of dispositions and an advantage for my view. Integrating
the laws of nature into the picture, however, appears to force condi-
tionals back onto us and thus makes the problem raise its head even
within the alternative conception of dispositions. What this makes
clear, however, is that the problem is not a specific problem for my
(non-conditional) account of dispositions; it is rather a problem for
dispositionalism about modality quite generally.
I do not have the space here to provide a full solution to this in-
teresting problem, nor am I certain what a solution would look like.
But an obvious place to look for a solution is in the assumptions that
I have made explicit above.
Consider assumption 2: Are all fundamental dispositions nomolog-
ical dispositions? This does not seem obvious to me. Even if physics
supplies nothing but nomological dispositions, and (part of) physics
is our best science of the fundamental, it does not follow that physics
says all there is to say about the fundamental level. The fundamental
may be thought to include some logical facts, but it does not follow
that physics must incorporate the study of logic. More to our present
point, if I am right about the logic of potentiality, then any way that
things are fundamentally entails their having the potentiality to be
that way, and I see no reason why that potentiality should not equally
count as fundamental (see section 5 for more on this). If, further, some
of the way things are are not themselves conditional (if, for instance,
some fundamental properties are categorical), then we will have non-
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conditional fundamental potentialities. This is not enough for present
purposes since I have not yet argued for any potentialities that might
ground non-actualized, non-conditional possibilities. Still, these con-
siderations open up some space for rejecting assumption 2 and evading
Bird’s problem.
Alternatively, we might question assumption 3: Are all nomologi-
cal dispositions conditional in form? In some other cases of apparently
conditional dispositions, such as water-solubility, I have argued that
the manifestation is really to be understood in causal terms (Vetter
2015, 96-98; Vetter 2014, 148-151). Thus water-solubility, on my view,
is not the disposition to dissolve if put in water, but rather the disposi-
tion to dissolve-in-water, that is, to be caused by (immersion in) water
to dissolve. Perhaps I was wrong to build conditionals into the man-
ifestation of the nomological dispositions; perhaps something like this
causal story would work better there too.3 A disposition to be caused
by Φing to Ψ seems a better candidate for implying the possibility of
both Φing and Ψing than a disposition to Ψ-if-Φ. But it remains to be
seen, first, how this is best integrated with the quantitative nature of
the nomological dispositions, and second, whether it is borne out by
our best (philosophy of) physics.
There are, then, some directions in which one might go to solve
Bird’s problem of non-conditional possibilities. But I suspect that the
problem will trouble dispositionalists for some time to come.
2 Degrees of potentiality and possible worlds:
Response to Wildman
Nathan Wildman offers three objections to the account of potentiality
and of possibility that I develop in Vetter 2015. I will here take up the
first objection.4
Wildman’s objection (in section 2 of his paper) is directed against
the proportional understanding of the graded possibility involved in
dispositions which I have set out in section 1 in response to Bird’s
3For independent reasons, I do believe I was wrong to build a material conditional
into the manifestation of nomological dispositions. For as Ralf Busse has pointed out,
that threatens triviality: things might possess the disposition to Φ-if-Ψ simply by having
the disposition to not-Ψ (see Busse 2015). Whatever solves this problem might solve the
problem of non-conditional possibilities as well.
4I suspect that the second objection (appealing to the distinction between being de-
structible and being perishable) can be dealt with on the level of semantics, not meta-
physics, by writing the relevant kind membership as an additional condition into the truth
conditions; or perhaps even on the level of pragmatics. The third objection can be avoided,
as Wildman points out, by adopting ‘permanentism’ or eternalism. For reasons sketched
in Vetter 2015, ch.7.9, I believe that I am committed to that view anyway.
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criticism. To have a disposition, on the view I defend, is simply to have
a potentiality to a sufficient degree; and degrees are best captured in
comparative terms. Wildman captures my view of such comparative
degrees in the principle
PROPORTION x has [a] potentiality [to] P to a greater degree than
y iff the proportion of worlds where x has its relevant intrinsic
features and P s is greater than the proportion of worlds where y
has its relevant intrinsic features and P s. (p.4)
That is, indeed, the gist of my conception of degrees, insofar as it
is to be captured in terms of possible worlds – and insofar as it applies
to intrinsic potentialities. With extrinsic potentialities, we would have
to add the relevant extrinsic features along with the intrinsic ones.
Wildman then develops an ingenious counterexample to PROPOR-
TION, which has the following structure. Let P be a process with a
certain necessary precondition (in Wildman’s example, P is killing hu-
mans by venom, and the necessary precondition is the existence of
humans). Now let y, but not x, be essentially tied to the obtaining of
that precondition (in Wildman’s example, y is a cybernetic cobra that
is essentially made by humans, x is an ordinary cobra with no such
essential ties to humans). Then the relevant worlds for x will include
a large class of worlds where x does not P simply because the precon-
dition is not met. Since y is by its essence precluded from existing in
such worlds, the relevant worlds for y will not include a correspond-
ing class. As a result, the proportions are skewed: y (the cybernetic
cobra) will have a much higher proportion of P -worlds among the rel-
evant worlds than x even if x intuitively has the potentiality to P to a
greater degree (i.e., has a higher proportion of P -worlds among those
where the necessary condition is satisfied).
So we have a counterexample to PROPORTION: x has the poten-
tiality to P to a greater degree than y, but its proportion of P -worlds
among the relevant worlds is not higher, and may indeed be much
lower, than y’s. Wildman concludes that the ‘possibility of such cases
strongly calls into question understanding talk of potentiality degrees
in terms of talk of proportions of worlds’ (p.6).
I would like to consider three possible responses to this counterex-
ample.
A first response is to point out that Wildman’s example is one of
an extrinsic, not an intrinsic potentiality. Whether or not something
is venomous to humans plausibly depends on humans, in two ways: it
depends on the existence of humans, and on their physiology. But for
extrinsic potentialities, PROPORTION cannot be upheld as it stands
in any case: we will have to consider worlds where not only x has its
relevant intrinsic features, but where the relevant external factors also
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hold. Worlds in which humans have evolved to have a different physi-
ology that makes them immune to the cobra’s venome are not relevant;
and neither are worlds where there are no humans. Writing the exis-
tence and physiology of humans into the conditions that circumscribe
the relevant worlds clearly gets rid of Wildman’s counterexample: we
need not consider those worlds in which x, the ordinary cobra, exists
unaccompanied by any humans. However, this response relies on a
specific feature of Wildman’s case: its extrinsicality. It may not apply
to other similar cases; but perhaps it can be generalized.
A second strategy thus generalizes the first. The first response
disposed of the troublesome worlds (those where x exists but the pre-
conditions for P ing are not met) by requiring that certain extrinsic
features of the objects are held fixed. But we could dispose of them
more directly, by simply requiring that, in addition to keeping fixed
the relevant intrinsic features of the object in question, at the relevant
worlds all relevant preconditions for their P ing are met. (It is a difficult
question what makes a precondition ‘relevant’; but the same is true for
the question what makes an intrinsic feature ‘relevant’, so I think we
can justify postponing that question.) Since the existence of humans
is a precondition for their being poisoned, we have again excluded the
troublesome worlds in Wildman’s example, and have done so in a way
that generalizes beyond the extrinsic potentialities. It is obvious that
such a response will need to spell out the notion of a ‘precondition’. It
might do so in conceptual or logical terms; but it might also do so in
genuinely modal terms: C is a precondition for P ing iff, necessarily, if
anything P s then C. Would it be circular for the potentiality theorist
to appeal to modality at this stage, in understanding potentiality it-
self? No, since PROPORTION is at any rate not meant as a reductive
account of degrees. It is merely a formal model, used to capture the
formal structure of potentialities’ degrees.
This brings me to a third, and indeed my preferred response, which
may be combined with the previous one but can also stand on its own.
It is that PROPORTION was never meant to be more than a formal
model, capturing or at least approximating the formal structure of de-
grees of potentiality. Wildman considers a response along these lines
and complains that it ‘makes potentiality degrees even more mysteri-
ous’ (p.7) and that ‘for those of us who struggle to understand poten-
tiality degrees, this [kind of response] is cold comfort’ (p.7). I respond
that Wildman does not seem to struggle to understand potentiality
degrees: he has a very clear grip, in his own counterexample to PRO-
PORTION, on the question of which cobra is more venomous than the
other. That kind of grip, like our knowledge of what can and can’t
happen, is prior to any possible-worlds semantics; the semantics, after
all, is modelled in such a way as to capture our intuitive judgements.
Wildman’s point, of course, is that he and others fail to have a more
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theoretical, philosophical understanding of potentiality degrees except
in terms of possible worlds. I agree that more needs to be said about
potentiality degrees than I do in my book (I have tried to say a little
more in Vetter 2018b; see also section 3). What needs to be done, I
think, is to carefully reflect on our pretheoretic judgements of poten-
tiality degrees (of this being more fragile than that, of one person being
more able to run than another) and their inferential relationships, and
to formulate general principles about them (such as a transitivity prin-
ciple, or a complementarity principle for which I have argued: the more
x is disposed to P , the less x is disposed to non-P , and vice versa),
which can then be tested against further reflections of our pretheoretic
judgement – and so on, until we have reached a kind of equilibrium.
What more can we do? The theory I propose takes potentiality as its
primitive. New primitives are often met with complaints of unintelli-
gibility. The best that their proponents can do is work with them and
show them to be fruitful.
3 Dispositionalist necessity and the role of
causation: Response to Yates
In an earlier paper (Yates 2015), David Yates argued that disposition-
alism in its most straightforward form (the form I defend) fails to be
formally adequate since it does not provide the dispositions we need
to distinguish between necessary truths (such as, 2+2=4) and neces-
sary falsehoods (such as, 2+2=5). Responding to his paper gave me
the opportunity to elaborate further on how I understand degrees of
dispositions or potentiality (see Vetter 2018b):5
Degrees, I argued, are best understood so as to give rise to a prin-
ciple of proportionality, such that the degree of any object x’s po-
tentiality to Φ is always indirectly proportional to the degree of x’s
potentiality not to Φ. This principle of proportionality, in turn, gives
rise to what Yates (in this issue) calls universality: the claim that for
all x and Φ, it is always true either that x is disposed to Φ or that x
is disposed not to Φ (or, of course, both). Universality in turn implies
that objects do have dispositions which are always necessarily mani-
festing, such as a disposition to be dancing-or-not-dancing, or indeed
a disposition to be such that 2+2=4. Yates had briefly considered
but swiftly rejected this response in his 2015 paper under the title ‘a
plenitude of powers’.
5Since Yates prefers the term ‘disposition’ to my ‘potentiality’, and I did the same in
my response (Vetter 2018b) to his earlier paper (Yates 2015), I will in this section use two
terms interchangeably. See section 4 for a more precise explanation of how I intended to
distinguish them in Vetter 2015.
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The ultimate source of our disagreement, though, is not a matter of
whether ontology ought to be plenitudinous or sparse. It is, as Yates
makes very clear in his contribution to this issue, our different take
on the relation between dispositionality and causation. Yates takes
dispositions to be essentially linked with causation; even if we went
beyond efficient causal powers (i.e., dispositions to cause events) in
our theory of dispositions, we must still maintain some link between
dispositions and causation. I, on the other hand, stress the modal as-
pect of dispositions: they concern what can be, and while that is often
(and especially in the cases that interest us) linked with causation, it
need not be so.
Yates’s argument proceeds, not by tackling this disagreement head-
on, but by arguing against my principles of proportionality and uni-
versality. He agrees that the former implies the latter, and provides
counterexamples against both. The counterexamples initially rely on
the standard model of dispositions as coming with a stimulus and a
separate manifestation. The disposition to sing when it rains, for in-
stance, does not appear to be indirectly proportional in its degree to
the disposition not to sing when it rains; in fact, Yates argues, one
might lack both because rain simply makes no difference to whether
or not one sings.6
Now, I do not accept the standard model in which a disposition is
characterized by a stimulus and a manifestation. Yates notes that ‘it
is not clear ... whether or not [I take] the argument from degrees to
depend on [my alternative conception of dispositions]’ (p. 12, fn. 17).
That is because I had hoped that the argument did not so depend.
But Yates’s argument convinces me that it does. So let me outline
how my manifestation-only conception of dispositions accommodates
Yates’s apparent counterexamples.
As Yates points out, my way of dealing with such apparently stimulus-
involving dispositions as the disposition to sing when it rains is to pack
it all into the manifestation: what Yates has in mind, on my view, is
the potentiality to be-caused-by-rain-to-sing. Applying the principle of
proportionality to this potentiality, Yates asks where we should apply
the negation: if we give the negation narrow scope, then the poten-
tiality to be-caused-by-rain-to-sing must be indirectly proportional to
the potentiality to be-caused-by-rain-not-to-sing; if we give the nega-
tion wide scope, then our potentiality must be indirectly proportional
to the potentiality not-to-be-caused-by-rain-to-sing. Yates favours the
6I might point out here that I accept dispositions, or rather potentialities, of very low
degrees, so the probability of one’s singing given rain would not have to be high to warrant
the ascription of a potentiality to sing when it rains. This takes care of the final remark.
But it does not make the proportionality principle any more appealing when applied to
Yates’s case.
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narrow-scope view and argues, convincingly, that it does not yield pro-
portionality.
However, it should be clear that this is not an instance of the prin-
ciple of proportionality as I have stated it. On my view, a potentiality
comes with a manifestation only. The proportionality principle applies
to potentialities with contradictory manifestations: the potentiality to
Φ, and the potentiality not to Φ. If we replace Φ with ‘be caused by
rain to sing’, then the potentiality not to Φ is the potentiality not to be
caused by rain to sing (i.e., it uses the wide-scope negation of Φ). Any
temptation to go for a narrow-scope negation is driven by the idea that
it is singing, and not the complex property of being-caused-by-rain-to-
sing, which is somehow the ‘real’ manifestation of the potentiality in
question. But my view leaves no room for a ‘real’ manifestation within
the manifestation.
Given the wide-scope reading of the negation, Yates agrees that
proportionality and hence universality succeeds. In fact, he claims
that on this reading ‘universality would be a logical truth: either x
is disposed to Φ, or not [x is disposed to Φ]’ (p. 14), because ‘the
most natural way to render “x is disposed not to be caused to sing by
rain” in the stimulus-manifestation idiom is: not [x is disposed to sing
when it rains]’ (p. 13). Now, what is or isn’t the most natural reading
of a sentence in the stimulus-manifestation idiom is neither here nor
there, since we are dealing with the alternative, manifestation-only,
conception.7 But there is an independent objection in the remark that
I have quoted: it says that the wide-scope reading collapses into a
negated disposition ascription. That would make my principle trivial
indeed, but it is not true. We can distinguish between something’s
having a potentiality not to be caused by rain to sing, and its lacking
the potentiality to be caused by rain to sing. The former, but not
the latter, comes in degrees: one can be more or less disposed not to
be caused by rain to sing, with the maximal degree amounting to a
(relative) necessity of never being caused by rain to sing. Of course,
the distinction is thin, given my own argument for proportionality, but
it is nevertheless there.
I do, therefore, hold on to the principles of proportionality and uni-
versality, and continue to hold that there are potentialities which are
necessarily always manifested, such as the potentiality to be such that
2+2=4. Yates, however, has another objection. Even if proportional-
ity and universality hold for values of Φ that are suitable as manifesta-
7Yates may have in mind here the idea that the stimulus-manifestation idiom is so
much more natural that I must be able to translate my own idiom back into it. I tend
to believe, and I have argued in Vetter 2014, that the stimulus-manifestation idiom has
no pretheoretical force, and I would venture to claim that appearances to the contrary
stem from contemporary philosophers being raised on a dogma that dates back to classical
empiricism and its concern with verification.
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tions of dispositions, the argument should not be carried over to such
properties as being such that 2+2=4, for that property is simply not
embedded in the causal nexus. It is here that we return to our ulti-
mate disagreement: how do dispositions relate to causation? In Vetter
2018b, I cite examples from Nolan 2015, as well as from physics to
show that some dispositions have manifestations that are non-causal.
However, Yates points out that Nolan’s dispositions can at least be
taken to be grounded in more fundamental causal dispositions, and
that it is controversial whether the examples from physics are really
non-causal. Neither applies to the disposition or potentiality to be such
that 2+2=4, if there is one: it is uncontroversially and fundamentally
uncausal.
We have come full circle to our initial and basic disagreement: are
there dispositions that are entirely acausal, i.e., not embedded at all
in the causal nexus? Yates insists that there aren’t, while I hold that
there are. I do agree with Yates that our initial and paradigmatic
examples of dispositions and hence of potentialities, both from ordinary
life and from science, are causal in some sense. If they were not, then
recognizing them would be less useful for our practical purposes of
manipulating objects and predicting their behaviour. In philosophy,
we inevitably generalize beyond the initial and paradigmatic examples.
In doing so in the present case, we can hold on to the causal element
and stop where it gives out; we may even reserve a term, be it “power”
or even “disposition”, for the result of such a generalization. But note
that this would be a decision, not an analysis of an already established
usage: “disposition”, in the philosopher’s vernacular, is a theoretical
term. And instead of stopping where causation gives out, we can also
generalize further and notice that there is a modal element involved
in our initial range of cases which can in principle be separated from
the causal one. It is certainly not a conceptual confusion to say that
some fundamental properties are dispositional (in the sense of “are
like our initial examples of dispositions”) but acausal; Yates provides
reasons against the truth of such a claim, but not against its conceptual
coherence. (For more examples, seeVetter 2015, 98.) Thus it seems we
can generalize beyond the confines of causal dispositions; and if we can,
why shouldn’t we do so where it fits our theoretical purposes? One
response to this question is that without integration into the causal
network we have no reason to believe that such properties really exist.
But I would beg to differ: causation is but one kind of explanation,
and we might as well take integration into the explanatory order of the
world as evidence of existence. (In fact, I am inclined to think that
the big metaphysical questions are not questions about existence at
all, but are rather questions about the explanatory order of the world;
see also below, section 5.) And if that is so, then I believe that there
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is plenty of space for such properties as maximal potentialities, which
explain, for instance, why things have no potential for doing otherwise.
This does not, of course, settle the debate but merely serves to point
to the more general and in some sense deeper issues that underly it:
David Yates’s and my different conceptions of dispositions are rooted,
I suggest, in our different conceptions of metaphysics itself. But to
discuss those directly is a task that I must leave for another time.
4 Degrees, dispositions, and the metaphysics
of potentiality: Response to McKitrick
Potentiality is rather handwaving about the exact metaphysics of po-
tentialities: are they universals, and if so, are they universals of the
Aristotelian or of the Platonic variety? Or could they be fit into a nom-
inalist metaphysics? My hope was that what I said in the book was
compatible with a wide array of answers to these questions. Jennifer
McKitrick challenges this hopeful attitude.
There is much that I agree with in McKitrick’s paper. She is cer-
tainly right, for instance, that neither Class Nominalism nor Resem-
blance Nominalism are viable options for an account of potentialities
along the lines that I envisage, despite my officially non-committed
stance on the metaphysics of properties in Potentiality.
Rather than going through her many arguments one by one – which,
desirable as it would be, is impossible in the limited space I have here
– I would like to address one central premise that runs through several
of her arguments, and which concerns the relation of a determinable
potentiality to its determinates, the specific degrees of that potential-
ity. On my behalf, McKitrick reconstructs an argument that appears
to show that the determinable potentiality is, on my view, more fun-
damental than the determinate, degreed, potentialities. She takes this
claim not as in itself a reductio ad absurdum of my view, but rather
as a view which a metaphysics of potentialities must, and which most
candidate metaphysics fail to, accommodate.
I do not endorse the claim that a determinable potentiality is more
fundamental than its determinate degrees, and I do not think that I
am committed to the claim. To show why, let me begin by reproducing
the crucial premises of the argument which McKitrick has constructed
on my behalf (the premises are quoted from McKitrick, p.4; quotations
and page numbers within the premises refer to Vetter 2015):
3. A disposition is a degree of a potentiality: “having a disposition
such as fragility is a matter of having the right potentiality (in
this case the potentiality to break or be broken) to a contextually
sufficient degree” (22).
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5. Potentialities ground dispositions: “The notion of a potential-
ity has been introduced as the metaphysical background to the
context-dependent notion of a disposition” (96).
If these two premises are granted, it follows that determinable po-
tentialities ground at least some of their determinates; and then it
would be arbitrary not to claim that they ground all of their determi-
nates.
I do not accept either premise 3 or premise 5 as stated in McK-
itrick’s words. Explaining why not gives me a welcome opportunity to
further clarify the relation between dispositions and potentialities, or
rather: between the notion of a disposition and that of a potentiality.
In Vetter 2015, 80-84, I claim that the relation between a given
disposition term, say ‘fragile’, and the corresponding potentiality, i.e.,
the potentiality to break, is analogous to that between ‘tall’ and height.
To clarify why I reject premises 3 and 5, I will again refer to this
analogy.
Consider, first, premise 3, and its analogue with ‘fragile’ replaced
by ‘tall’ and ‘potentiality’ by ‘height’:
3’. Tallness is a degree of height: “[being tall] is a matter of having
[height] to a contextually sufficient degree” (22).
Clearly, 3’ is false: tallness is not itself a degree of height. To start
with, there is no one property of tallness: ‘tall’ expresses different prop-
erties in different contexts. Given a particular context, of course, ‘tall’
does express a particular property. But that property is not identical
with any particular (degree/determinate of) height. There are many
determinate heights that can make an individual satisfy the predicate
‘is tall’, as interpreted in a given context. We can think of the prop-
erty expressed by ‘is tall’ in a given context as involving something
like existential quantification: as the property of having some deter-
minate height above a given threshold. Thus an individual’s satisfying
‘is tall’, as interpreted in a given context, depends on or is grounded in
the individual’s particular determinate height property; but the prop-
erty expressed is not identical with any particular determinate height
property.
For exactly analogous reasons, 3 is false: fragility is not itself a
degree of the potentiality to break. To start with, there is no one
property of fragility: ‘fragile’ expresses different properties in different
contexts.Given a particular context, of course, ‘fragile’ does express a
particular property. But that property is not identical with any given
degree of the potentiality to break. There are many determinate de-
grees of the potentiality to break that can make an object satisfy the
predicate ‘is fragile’, as interpreted in a given context. We can think
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of the property expressed as involving something like existential quan-
tification: as the property of having some determinate degree of the
potentiality to break that is above a given threshold. Thus an individ-
ual’s satisfying ‘is fragile’, as interpreted in a given context, depends
on or is grounded in the individual’s determinate of the potentiality to
break; but the property expressed is not identical with any particular
determinate potentiality.
Thus premise 3 is misleading: it is not true that a disposition is a
degree of a potentiality, though it is true that the property expressed
by a dispositional predicate in a given context depends on the degree
of the potentiality.
Premise 5, too, is false, as is its analogue with ‘tall’ and ’height:
5’. Height ground tallness: “The notion of [height] has been intro-
duced as the metaphysical background to the context-dependent
notion of [tallness]” (96).8
With the term ‘metaphysical background’, as quoted in 5, I did not
intend to introduce yet another redescription of grounding. Rather, I
meant to describe the contrast between a semantic phenomenon, the
context-sensitive variability of a predicate’s intension, and the meta-
physics that provides the material for that variation. The metaphys-
ical background in this sense is the range of phenomena from which
the context-sensitive expression picks its semantic values, depending
on the context.
Height, both the determinable and its determinates, are the meta-
physical background for ‘tall’, since it is from these properties that
any context selects semantic values for ‘tall’ (not by picking one, but
by setting a threshold, as described above). This is not to say, as 5’
says, that height (the determinable) grounds tallness. Rather, and as
we have seen above, it is the instantiated determinate that does the
grounding in any particuar case.
Likewise, potentiality, both determinable and determinate, is the
metaphysical background for ‘fragile’, since it is from these properties
that any context selects semantic values for ‘fragile’ (not by picking
one, but by setting a threshold, as described above). This is not to
say, as 5 says, that the determinable potentiality to break grounds
fragility. Rather, and as we have seen above, it is the instantiated
determinate/degree that does the grounding in any particuar case.
In short, ‘potentiality’ is contrasted with ‘disposition’ not as deter-
minable with determinate, but rather as the metaphysical level, includ-
ing both determinable and determinates, with the semantic. Once this
85’ is false also because that is not how the notion of height has been introduced into
discourse. But let’s disregard this disanalogy; it does nothing to undermine the analogy
that I am after.
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is recognized, it should be clear that the argument does not go through,
and we have no more reason to accept McKitrick’s conclusion:
8. Therefore, determinable potentialities are more fundamental than
their determinate dispositions: “the general dispositions are not
only equally fundamental as the specific ones, they are more fun-
damental” (57),
than we do to accept the analogous
8’ Therefore, height is more fundamental than its individual deter-
minates.
But if I reject McKitrick’s argument, why do I seem to endorse its
conclusion in the quotation she gives under 8?
The quotation comes from a passage where I discuss, and ulti-
mately reject, the conditional conception of dispositions (see section
1). Within that conception, I argue, we must distinguish between the
general disposition to break if struck, or to exert a force of F =  eqr2
when at distance r from an object with charge q; and the specific dis-
position to break if struck with a force of 8.35N, or to exert a repulsive
force of 8× 10−8N when at a distance of 5.3× 10−11m from a charge
of 1.6 × 10−19C. With that distinction in place, I ask which of these
dispositions are more fundamental, the general or the specific. I ar-
gue that the conditional conception favours the specific dispositions,
while independent philosophical considerations on grounding and fun-
damentality would favour the general dispositions, thus questioning
the adequacy of the conditional conception. The independent philo-
sophical considerations that I adduce draw strongly on Jessica Wilson’s
arguments to the effect that determinables can be fundamental. But
I am explicit that general dispositions do not relate to specific ones
as determinables to determinates (Vetter 2015, 53; 55): unlike a de-
terminable, whose instantiation necessitates the instantiation of one of
its determinates to the exclusion of all others, instantiating a general
disposition necessitates instantiation of all or at least very many of the
corresponding specific dispositions.
While my argument about general and specific dispositions thus
makes use of Wilson’s arguments, I never make the corresponding
claim about determinable potentialities and their degree-determinates,
let alone the stronger claim expressed in McKitrick’s 8. My reasons for
not making that claim are very much the same reasons that McKitrick
gives on p. 15. Exactly how we are to understand the relation between
the determinable potentiality and its determinates, the individual de-
grees of potentiality, is a difficult question that I do not address in the
book. I suspect, however, that it will be a question that is not specific
to the metaphysics of potentiality but rather to be answered by general
considerations about determinables and determinates. McKitrick may
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very well be right that an answer to this question will have repercus-
sions for our ontology of potentialities in particular, and of properties
in general.
The main question posed by McKitrick remains, of course: what is
the best metaphysics for the properties that I call potentialities? I will
take this question up again in the next section.
5 The metaphysics of potentiality, ground-
ing, and counterpossibles: Reponse to Gi-
annini and Tugby
Like Jennifer McKitrick, Giacomo Giannini and Matthew Tugby ask
about the metaphysics of potentialities: are they universals, and if so,
are they best understood in Platonist or in Aristotelian terms? Their
arguments, which I take to be offered in a constructive spirit, suggest
that we (or, at any, rate, I) had better think of potentialities as Platonic
universals.
Tugby (2013) has forcefully argued that dispositionalists are com-
mitted to a Platonist conception of properties; very roughly, the ar-
gument is that if a disposition is individuated (at least in part) by its
manifestation, then if anything is to have a disposition to Φ, there must
be some property of Φing in the first place. On both nominalist and
Aristotelian theories of properties, the existence of such a property is
dependent on its being instantiated, sometimes and somewhere; only
on a Platonist conception could there be a property of Φing even if
nothing has ever, and nothing ever will, Φ. But clearly things could
have such dispositions; hence we should adopt the Platonist concep-
tion.
My resistance to such a full-blown Platonist conception is attributed,
by Giannini and Tugby, to ‘ontological naturalism’, the ‘doctrine that
reality consists of nothing but a single all-embracing spatio-temporal
system’ (Armstrong 1981, 149, cited on p. 5). I am not sure that I am
an ontological naturalist in this sense; I have certainly not excluded
the existence of abstract objects (see Vetter 2015, ch.7.7). As I have
briefly indicated above (section 3), I tend to think that the big meta-
physical questions are, pace the Quinean tradition, not questions about
ontology in the sense of ‘what there is’, but are rather questions about
the explanatory order of the world or ‘what grounds what’ in Schaffer
(2009)’s useful turn of phrase.9 What does motivate my approach is
not so much a restriction of what there is to the spatio-temporal, but
rather an Aristotelian commitment that Wang, in her contribution to
9For more on this, see Vetter 2018a and Vetter ms.b; in Vetter 2015, this tendency is
manifested in the ontological liberalism professed on p. 29.
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this issue, captures with the term ‘de re first’. It is simply the idea
that our world is primarily one of objects, and that objects should be
given pride of place in our metaphysical theories. Among the objects in
our world, concrete, spatiotemporal objects are certainly paradigmatic,
and one motivation for the theory is that we can thus start with some-
thing that is deeply familiar and epistemically accessible. But clearly
my theory goes far beyond the familiar and ordinarily accessible, and
I do countenance abstract objects. So the focus on concrete, ordinary
objects is not so much a matter of imposing the restrictive claim that
is made by ontological naturalism, but rather the implementation of
another Aristotelian idea, that we should start with the familiar (even
if the ultimate shape of our theory will turn out rather unfamiliar).
For these reasons, I would not describe myself as an ontological
naturalist in the sense at issue in Giannini and Tugby’s paper. Nev-
ertheless, I prefer an Aristotelian view of properties to full-blown Pla-
tonism precisely because Aristotelianism puts objects first. In Vetter
2015, ch.7.5, I suggest that the Aristotelian approach is right in think-
ing that which properties exist depends on how objects are. But unlike
standard Aristotelian approaches, I do not claim that a property exists
iff it is (sometimes, somewhere) instantiated. Instead, I suggest that
a property exists iff it is instantiated, or potentially instantiated, or
potentially potentially instantiated, and so forth – in short, there is a
property of being Φ just in case something has (or some things have)
an iterated potentiality for something to be Φ. (Given axiom T for
potentiality, this includes the case where something actually is Φ.) In
this way, we obtain a great many more properties than those which
happen to be instantiated, and ensure that every potentiality has a
property to serve as its manifestation. But unlike the Platonist, we
do not make those properties quite independent of the instantiating
objects. Giannini and Tugby put this by saying that on my view even
‘unmanifested properties exist in the sense that they are grounded in
the potentialities of things’ (p.15, second emphasis mine; I will note
my reservations about the formulation below).
Giannini and Tugby note that this view is ‘dangerously (or, [they]
think, fortunately) close to Platonism’ (p. 14), and I agree: the
main difference is that on my view properties must still be ultimately
grounded in objects, thus satisfying my de re first approach. Against
this view (and hence in favour of full-blown Platonism), Giannini and
Tugby object that it ‘seems incoherent to suppose that potentialities,
which are ontologically fundamental, could be individuated by some-
thing less fundamental than themselves and which they themselves
ground’ (p. 16). I see two related objections here. The first is ex-
plicit and concerns a ‘principle of purity’, which says that potentiali-
ties, being ontologically fundamental, could not be individuated by the
less fundamental properties that are their uninstantiated manifestation
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properties. The second, which is only implicit, is a circularity prob-
lem: how can the potentiality provide the ground for the manifestation,
when it is itself (via its individuation) grounded in the manifestation
property?
To respond to both objections, I would like to clarify the grounding
picture that is suggested in my Aristotelian view of properties. The
Aristotelian picture I suggest is one on which objects, by being some
way or another, ground their properties. But they do not ground them
one by one. Rather, on the dispositionalist picture, we can think of
properties as nodes in a vast network held together by the manifesta-
tion relation. By instantiating any one property, an object gives reality
to the whole network to which it belongs. Despite the metaphorical
nature of the description, I hope it is clear how it disarms the circu-
larity worry: by denying that a potentiality grounds its manifestation.
Rather, it is objects that ground both the potentiality and the manifes-
tation, but by instantiating only one of them, the potentiality. So I do
not, after all, want to say with Giannini and Tugby that ‘unmanifested
properties exist in the sense that they are grounded in the potentiali-
ties of things’; rather, I want to say that unmanifested properties exist
because they are grounded in things, and more specifically in those
things which have a potentiality for their instantiation.
What about purity? Since potentialities do not, as I have just
argued, ground their manifestations, the manifestation need not be less
fundamental than the potentiality after all, and we can individuate a
potentiality in terms of its manifestation without violating a principle
of purity.
We might worry that potentialities aren’t fundamental after all if
they, along with their manifestation properties, are grounded in ob-
jects. But in saying that (some) potentialities are fundamental, I never
intended to contrast them with entities of other categories (although I
did not make that explicit). The contrast, after all, is with Humeanism.
According to Humeans, the properties at the fundamental level of na-
ture are all categorical; according to dispositionalism, the properties at
the fundamental level of nature, if there is one,10 at least include dis-
positions or potentialities. The fundamentality claim is applied within
the realm of properties, and should be independent of whether there is
a further dependence relation between properties quite generally and
objects.
So far, I have given some motivation for the Aristotelian view of
properties that I suggest in Vetter 2015, ch. 7.5, and I have tried to
10I am now inclined to think that the debate should not be framed as one about what
there is at the fundamental level, but rather as one about explanatory hierarchies which
may or may not terminate at a fundamental level: see, again, Vetter 2018a and Vetter
ms.b.
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defend it against an objection. But for all I have said, Platonism might
still be the better metaphysics of potentialities, despite going against
my de re first approach.
One intriguing reason for adopting Platonism is given in section
3 of Giannini and Tugby’s paper: only Platonism allows for super-
alien properties (properties for whose instantiation nothing has even
an iterated potentiality), which in turn are needed to make (dispo-
sitionalist) sense of certain scientific claims, to wit, counternomic or
counterlegal conditionals in the context of idealizations (cf. p. 18-23).
Giannini and Tugby note that both a fictionalist approach and my own
view that counterpossibles often concern epistemic rather than meta-
physical modality would provide a solution here, but argue that both
solutions ‘incur the cost of leaving us with a disunified treatment of
scientific modal discourse’ (p. 23). As mere pointers toward possible
responses, I want to mention two things. First, how unified the rele-
vant scientific practices are is an empirical matter which it is difficult
to judge from the armchair; we would need philosophically informed
sociology of science to establish it. Second, even if there is a unified
practice, this does not entail that unified truth conditions underly it.
As Emanuel Viebahn and I have argued elsewhere for the case of modal
auxiliaries (Viebahn and Vetter 2016), different kinds of facts may play
the same role in our practices and for that reason be expressed with
the same kinds of terms; we should not then infer from sameness of ex-
pressions to sameness of truth-conditions. This said, it is obvious that
the question of super-aliens and counternomics is one that certainly
merits more detailed consideration than I can give it here, and one on
which dispositionalists can and will reasonably disagree.
6 Metaphysical modality, time, and meth-
ods: Response to Wang
Jennifer Wang characterizes my theory as ‘de re first’ and contrasts it
with her own, incompatibility-based view of modality, which is ‘de dicto
first’. I wholeheartedly endorse the characterization of my approach
as de re first: giving pride of place to objects in our metaphysics is
indeed one of the foremost motivations for the approach. Wang raises
two objections against my particular version of a de re first account.
Wang’s first objection arises directly from my focus on objects. It
is the worry that the approach cannot account for paradigmatically
de dicto modal truths: necessarily, all squares have linear sides; nec-
essarily all yellow things are coloured (both on p.6); and the sentence
numbered on p. 7:
(4) Necessarily, no negatively charged objects are positively charged.
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On a de re first approach, Wang suggests, we cannot get the re-
quired de dicto readings of truths like (4). All we get are truths such as
‘[a]ll negatively charged objects are necessarily not positively charged.
But’, Wang objects, ‘this is still only a de re modal predication rather
than a de dicto claim.’ (p.7)
Let us be clear what the challenge is. My task is to provide, in
terms of my potentiality-based theory, a de dicto reading of sentence
(4): a reading, that is, on which the necessity operator takes scope
over the quantifier ‘no’ in (4).
But this is a requirement that my approach can satisfy. The neces-
sity operator, on my view, is defined as follows: it is necessary that p
just in case nothing has, had, or will have an iterated potentiality for
non-p. Plugging that into the de dicto statement (4), we get:
(4DD) Nothing has, had, or will have an iterated potentiality for
it not to be the case that no negatively charged object that is
positively charged.
(Or, eliminating the double negation: Nothing has, had, or will
have an iterated potentiality for there to be a negatively charged
object that is positively charged.)
By contrast, the de re statement given by Wang will read:
(4DR) All negatively charged objects are such that nothing has, had
or will have an iterated potentiality for them to be positively
charged.
(4DD) is ‘de re’ in the sense that it quantifies over objects first; it
has a quantifier that takes wide scope (i.e. it scopes over the potential-
ity operator, the negation, and the other quantifier). This is because
my account sees a hidden quantifier ‘within’ the necessity operator.
But my task was not to get rid of wide-scope quantification over ob-
jects altogether; it was to make sure that the explicit quantifier in (4)
has narrow scope; and that it does, very clearly, in (4DD). (4DD), in
combination with the potentiality-based theory of modality, does just
what a de dicto reading of (4) should do: it excludes that there are po-
tentialities, hence possibilities, for anything to be both negatively and
positively charged; it does not exclude potentialities, and hence pos-
sibilities, for any of the actually negatively charged objects to change
and become positively charged instead. (And as it should, (4DR) does
the exact opposite.)
In short, the potentiality-based approach is ‘de re first’ in the sense
that it reduces modality to how things are. It does not follow that the
approach cannot allow for de dicto readings of modal sentences.
Wang’s second objection is also connected to my approach’s fo-
cus on objects, but with a more specific twist. Objects are typically
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contingent and temporal entities. They come into and go out of ex-
istence, and while existing they change in various ways. My account
appeals to just such changing features of individuals: their potentiali-
ties. Metaphysical modality, however, is supposed to be non-contingent
and atemporal. This is the tension that Wang’s paper makes very
clear. Her preferred account, based on incompatibility relations be-
tween properties, does not face the same problem. Properties (unlike
their instantiation by objects) do not appear to exhibit the contingency
and temporality that objects do.
Let me first point out that there are various ways to go here. One
way to go is to remain dispositionalist but cease to be de re first,
by quantifying, in the definition of modality, over properties and not
objects. (Roughly: It is possible that p just in case there is a property
Φ which is a power to bring it about that p.) That strategy is endorsed
by some (Jacobs 2010, Yates 2015; I believe that Giannini and Tugby
would be sympathetic as well) and, depending on the view of properties
it is paired with, holds some promise of overcoming the contingency and
temporality associated with objects. A second way is to remain de re
first but cease to be dispositionalist, by adopting instead an essentialist
account. Truths of essence, while still about objects, have been argued
to be not just atemporal and non-contingent, but in a certain sense even
outside the temporal and modal realm (Fine 2005).11 Still, I would like
to defend the combined dispositionalist and de re first account; so I
need to respond to Wang’s worries.
More specifically, Wang’s second objection concerns potentiality’s
relation with time. As she points out, the account seems to be unable
to accommodate possibility claims such as her sentence (p. 8)
(5) It’s possible for there to be an object that always exists in a uni-
verse with no beginning.
Wang says that she considers such cases not as counterexamples to
my view, but as ‘unintuitive consequence[s]’ (p.9) that ‘undermine a
crucial selling point of [my] theory: its intuitive attractiveness’ (6).
How is one to argue about intuitions, or alleged intuitions, such as
(5)? When debating metaphysical modality, philosophers often take it
to be unproblematic that we are all talking about the same thing and
genuinely disagreeing about it. But there is no pretheoretical, philo-
sophically neutral concept of, nor is there unproblematic reference to,
metaphysical modality that we can use to focus on the phenomenon
prior to giving a particular theory of it: unlike, say, knowledge, meta-
physical modality is a theoretical concept.
11This, incidentally, is one of the reasons why pace Wang (p.4), essence and potentiality
are not duals; see Vetter ms.a.
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There are, of course, related phenomena that it might be easier to
get a grip on. One is our ordinary, everyday understanding of modality
that qualifies as objective, albeit not as metaphysical: I can ride my
bike to work, but I cannot get from Berlin to Milano in less than an
hour. The other related phenomenon is logical modality, on which we
have perhaps a firmer, or at any rate a formally regimented, theoreti-
cal grip. Metaphysical modality is uncomfortably wedged between the
two. In our thinking about genuinely metaphysical modality, we might
either start from the logical notion and see how we can account for the
cases where logical does not entail metaphysical possibility; this is a
route taken, in very different ways, e.g. in Hale 2013 and Chalmers
2010. Or else we might start with the ordinary notion and see how we
can account for the cases where ordinary impossibility does not entail
metaphysical impossibility; this is a route taken or suggested, again in
different ways, in Williamson 2007 and Edgington 2004. The second
route is clearly the more congenial to a potentiality-based approach like
mine, which starts from our ordinary understanding of what we and
the objects around us can and cannot do. Wang, on the other hand,
seems to incline towards the first approach, e.g. when she writes, about
the case of a glass appearing ex nihilo, that ‘[t]here is no logical impos-
sibility, and hence, according to many, no metaphysical impossibility
involved in the supposition’ (p. 7).
Does it matter where we start in talking about metaphysical modal-
ity? I am inclined to think that it does. Starting with the wider notion
of logical possibility, we introduce restrictions: such-and-such is logi-
cally possible, but it is not metaphysically possible because ... . The
default for a proposition, at least if it is logically consistent, is possi-
bility; it is claims of impossibility that require justification. Starting
with the narrower notion that we express with everyday modals, we
must instead proceed by extending the scope of our modal concept:
such-and-such is impossible given the state of our technology, but it
is metaphysically possible because ... . Possibility is not the default
but rather something that needs to be justified and supported. (Much
of the argument in Vetter 2015 can be seen as giving this kind of jus-
tification, starting from ordinary modality in the form or dispositions
and abilities.)
It is unsurprising, then, that these two starting points engender
different intuitions. Are they even intuitions about the same phe-
nomenon, or are philosophers talking past each other when coming
from these two different starting points? This, I submit, is an open
question that should receive more attention than it has so far received.
What I would like to claim here is simply that things aren’t so clear-
cut when it comes to intuitions about metaphysical modality. What is
intuitive depends on where we start in getting a grip on this theoreti-
cal notion. Wang’s (5) seems highly intuitive when, like her, we start
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with logical modality and require positive justification for any neces-
sity that is not logical necessity. It seems, I submit, much less intuitive
when, like me, we start with ordinary modality and require positive
justification for any possibility that outstrips those possibilities which
we countenance in everyday life.
I will end, thus, with a desideratum. In thinking about metaphysi-
cal modality, we need to reflect and make explicit where we start; and
we need to reflect on whether and why we can assume that we are all
targetting a common, albeit theoretically circumscribed, phenomenon:
metaphysical modality.
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